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Abstract: Regulators’ irrational rationality and bankers’ rational irrationa-
lity. Too big to fail, self-regulation, moral hazard and the global financial cri-
sis 2007–2009. Banks and other financial institutions which were „too-big-
to-fail“ (TBTF) played a central role in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–
2009. The article lays out how misguided policies enabled banks to grow both 
in size as well as in complexity and therefore acquire TBTF status, particu-
larly in the 10-year period preceding the crisis. The article then proceeds by 
detailing how an ill-designed policy framework, relying on supposed market 
approaches to regulation – including self-regulation and credit rating agen-
cies – enabled TBTF financial institutions to game the system. They were the-
reby able to exploit the negative externalities which the flawed policy frame-
work – in connection with TBTF status – had granted to large, systemically 
important financial institutions. The article therefore identifies defective 
government policies as the chief cause of the financial crisis of 2007–2009, 
revealing an urgent need for financial sector reform. 
Key Words: Too-big-to-fail, Policy Failure, Financial Crisis, Economic Theory 
of Regulation, Deregulation
Introduction
In 2007, the global financial system was hit by what would turn out to be the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression. The possible causes of the Global Finan-
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cial Crisis of 2007–2009 are well documented, including a „global savings glut“1, 
lax monetary policy2, government subsidies for housing in general3 and via the two 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in particu-
lar4, deregulation of financial markets5, securitisation6 and the compensation struc-
ture at financial firms7 as well as credit rating agencies8. Perhaps the most defin-
ing aspect of the crisis, however, was the role large financial institutions played. 
Although these institutions are most commonly referred to as banks which are „too-
big-to-fail“ (TBTF), they need not necessarily be banks nor need they be big. Rather, 
any financial institution may be TBTF owing either to its size, complexity or inter-
connectedness or a combination thereof, which is reflected in the alternative term 
„large, complex financial institutions“ (LCFIs). Henceforth, the terms TBTF institu-
tions and LCFI will be used interchangeably, meaning to include all aspects making 
them systemically important (i.e. size, complexity, interconnectedness). Irrespective 
of nomenclature, these institutions share one characterising trait: Owing to their 
perceived systemic importance and the adverse effect their bankruptcy is believed to 
pose to the financial system and the economy, they are considered too systemically 
important to let them fail, and they constituted the nexus of the above stated fac-
tors.9 During the course of the Global Financial Crisis, all LCFIs, either directly or 
indirectly, received or benefited from some sort of government intervention. These 
government rescues comprised measures ranging from nationalisation (Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac) to capital injection by the government (e.g. AIG, Bank of America, 
Citigroup) as well as generous liquidity support for insolvent institutions by expand-
ing the Federal Reserve’s traditionally narrowly defined role as lender-of-last-resort. 
It is indeed intriguing that, although smaller banks became troubled during the cri-
sis as well, causality is generally seen to be running from large to smaller banks, not 
vice versa.10 The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the motivation, design and merit 
as well as effects and consequences of important financial policies in the 10-year 
period prior to 2007 which are related to increasing the TBTF problem. In accord-
ance with the general theme of this journal, particular emphasis is placed on iden-
tifying the dominant actors, conflicts of interests as well as agency problems which 
played a role in the lead-up to the financial crisis. While this necessarily entails 
identifying some of the major actors, the article’s aim is not so much finger point-
ing as exposing the system’s weaknesses as well as revealing possibilities for reform. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Part 1 will analyse two pieces of 
legislation which vastly increased both the scale and the scope of TBTF. In 1999, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act abolished the separation of commercial and investment 
banks, triggering financial supermarkets. One year later, the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 codified the existence of over-the-counter derivatives. 
Both Acts allowed financial institutions to become both too big and too complex to 
23ÖZG 26 | 2015 | 1
fail. Part 2 will explore how the shift towards supposedly market-based regulation 
by policymakers and regulators allowed banks and other financial institutions to 
exploit their TBTF status. In this context, the Basel framework and the shift towards 
internal risk models as well as over-reliance on credit rating agencies are analysed. 
Part 3 will provide a short summary as well as a conclusion and possibilities for 
future reform.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Advent of Financial Supermarkets
In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) abolished the separation of commer-
cial and investment banking, also known as Glass-Steagall, rewarding decades of 
lobbying effort by the financial industry. Since the introduction of federal deposit 
insurance in 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act had separated commercial banking from 
investment banking in order to confine federal deposit insurance to depository insti-
tutions. Generally, two different methods for handling bank failures stood at the dis-
posal of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the government agency 
that administrates the Deposit Insurance Fund. Under the payoff method, deposi-
tors were compensated up to the insurance limit. The proceeds from the liquidation 
of the bank’s assets were then used to reimburse non-insured creditors and depos-
itors with deposits above the insurance limit. Under the purchase and assumption 
(P&A) transaction, on the other hand, the FDIC tried to find a healthy institution 
which assumed some or all of the failed bank’s assets and some or all of its liabilities. 
This approach generally granted depositors and other creditors insurance above and 
beyond the maximum amount set by the law. From 1971 onwards, when handling 
bank failures, the FDIC exhibited a strong bias towards protecting depositors at large 
banks. By contrast, small banks were usually subjected to the ordinary resolution 
process. Between 1971 and 1984, 25 banks with assets in excess of $100m failed. All 
but one of these were handled by P&A transactions which protected depositors from 
losses regardless of the insurance limit.11 Additionally, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act of 1950 enabled the FDIC to provide open-bank assistance (OBA) to pre-
vent banks from failing, conditional on finding „essentiality“ („when in the opin-
ion of the Board of Directors the continued operation of such bank is essential to 
provide adequate banking service in the community“).12 In 1971, a small minor-
ity-owned and -catering bank in Boston (Unity Bank) was rescued based on this 
„essentiality“ out of fear that its failure would lead to a repetition of the race riots of 
the preceding years. As a financial journalist commented, the very first bailout had 
already hollowed out „essentiality“ by reinterpreting the word community – „that 
Congress had in mind for small, isolated rural communities“ – in a wider and con-
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temporary context.13 Sprague (2000), at that time on the FDIC’s Board of Directors, 
summed up the decision to assist Unity Bank as follows: „Now we were in the bailout 
business, how deeply no one could then tell.“14 Indeed, by bailing out Unity Bank, an 
important precedent for further bailouts had been set. As the problems of Franklin 
National Bank in 1974 revealed, TBTF measures were not confined to the FDIC as its 
conduit. In order to prevent the bank from failing, the Federal Reserve lent $1.7bn 
through the discount window. When Franklin was merged with another bank in 
October, the FDIC assumed the bank’s debt to the Fed.15 During the Latin Amer-
ican debt crisis in 1982, international organisations, governments and banks lent 
to insolvent countries in order to prevent huge write-downs at banks, thereby bail-
ing out the ten largest US money-centre banks, whose exposure to less-developed 
countries amounted to 222% of capital.16 The term „too-big-to-fail“ came into com-
mon use in 1984, when the FDIC bailed out Continental Illinois, granting its credi-
tors unlimited protection. Continental Illinois was then the seventh largest commer-
cial bank of the United States. At a Congressional hearing, the Comptroller of the 
Currency conceded that the eleven largest banks of the United States were too big 
to fail.17
The knowledge that large banks cannot be allowed to fail incentivises finan-
cial institutions to grow in order to reach the too-big-to-fail threshold. TBTF size, 
in turn, encourages moral hazard: banks take inordinate risk because they know 
that they are too-big-to-fail. TBTF institutions are enabled to pursue risky strate-
gies with no proportional increase in funding costs because creditors, too, know 
that they are too-big-to-fail. Hence they lend such banks at more favourable terms 
than they would otherwise do. TBTF may also lead to competitive advantages with 
regard to deposit taking. In return for relative safety, depositors are likely to put their 
money in banks at lower interest rates when they expect them to survive crises due 
to government interventions or bailouts. In sum, TBTF status grants banks substan-
tial competitive advantages against smaller institutions. Therefore, once the TBTF 
threshold is reached, competitive advantages almost automatically lead to further 
and accelerating growth of these institutions. 
Since the 1970s and increasingly since 1984, government rescues had incentiv-
ised banks and other financial institutions to grow in size in order to become TBTF 
and gain the associated benefits.18 It is not surprising that subsequent to the bailout 
of Continental Illinois and increasingly in the 1990s, the banking sector consolidated 
significantly. Boyd & Graham (1991) identify attaining TBTF size as an important 
motive for large bank mergers during that time period.19 Brewer & Jagtiani (2009) 
document that in the 1990s and early 2000s, banks paid significant premia in merg-
ers which would take them above the assumed TBTF threshold of $100bn.20 From 
1991 to 1998, 29 „megamergers“ occurred between banks with assets of at least 
25ÖZG 26 | 2015 | 1
$10bn each.21 In 1998, four of the nine largest mergers in history occurred in the 
banking sector, comprising banks with at least $100bn in assets each.22 The merger 
wave of the 1990s increased the market share of the ten largest banks from 25.6% in 
1990 to 44.8% in 1999, while the 50 largest banks held 68.1% of aggregate assets in 
1999.23 The new megabanks made the TBTF problem even worse. One year before 
passing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the TBTF doctrine had even been extended 
to hedge funds. Under the orchestration of the Federal Reserve, a bank consortium 
bailed out Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 (see below for more 
details). 
Summarising, by 1999, the problem of TBTF had already existed for a long time. 
Sprague (2000) remarked on that point: „The reality is that nearly all large bank fail-
ures are handled by bailout, either in name or its functional equivalent.“24 Already 
in 1999, large banks posed a severe and growing problem to the economy. How-
ever, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act exacerbated the problem by allowing cross-sec-
tional mergers. Evidently, the possibility of growing inter-sectionally is bounded by 
anti-competition concerns. Eliminating the sectional barrier, however, paved the 
way for even bigger banks. In addition, they also became much more complex. This 
increased the danger of too-complex-to-fail. As Avraham, Selvaggi & Vickery (2012) 
show, following the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the size and importance of non-bank 
subsidiaries increased dramatically.25 By the mid-2000s, Stern & Feldman (2004) 
identified 19 US banks to be potentially TBTF.26 Moreover, the blurring of commer-
cial and investment banking expanded FDIC coverage to non-commercial activities. 
For example, after the abolishment of Glass-Steagall, brokerage houses used deposit-
taking subsidiaries to convert securities transaction accounts into Money Market 
Deposit Accounts, which were insured by the FDIC.27 Similarly, Merrill Lynch and 
Lehman Brothers, which had the largest of these subsidiaries, financed their mort-
gage origination with FDIC-insured deposits.28 After being downgraded in 2011, 
Bank of America moved derivatives from its Merrill Lynch unit to a deposit-taking 
subsidiary, thereby putting the FDIC at risk in case of losses.29 
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
Similar to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Commodity Futures Moderniza-
tion Act (CFMA) of 2000 exacerbated the too-big-to-fail problem by codify-
ing the existence of unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives for sophis-
ticated participants. This included credit default swaps (CDS), the corpus delicti 
in the corporate suicide of the multinational insurance corporation AIG.30 The 
over-the-counter market lacks a central market place; instead, certain finan-
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cial institutions such as large commercial and investment banks act as dealers. 
In 1974, Congress had amended the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 so that all 
futures and options contracts on commodities and financial instruments be traded 
on regulated exchanges and created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) to regulate and supervise the market.31 The general aim of the legislation 
was to ensure transparency by requiring clearing mechanisms to ensure adequate 
capital and collateral („margin“) backing for contractual commitments. However, 
parallel to the thus created regulated market, the over-the-counter market began 
to grow rapidly. In contrast to exchange-traded derivatives, off-exchange transac-
tion do not clear via centralised platforms. Instead, the terms of the contract are 
privately negotiated between the largest financial institutions acting as dealers of 
over-the-counter derivatives. Therefore, no binding rules such as capital or collat-
eral requirements exist in this market, making undercapitalised transactions pos-
sible. In 1994, the General Accounting Office voiced concerns over off-exchange 
derivatives. The agency warned that the failure of any major over-the-counter deriv-
atives dealer could have catastrophic consequences and may require the govern-
ment „to intervene to keep the financial system functioning“, including „industry 
loans or a financial bailout paid for by taxpayers.“ Moreover, the report found that 
accounting standards for derivatives were insufficient and did not reflect economic 
reality. 32 In order to mitigate the risks of OTC derivatives, the General Accounting 
Office recommended that the availability of information and capital requirements be 
improved.33 In May 1998, the Commodity Futures Trade Commission under Chair-
woman Brooksley Born issued a concept release requesting comments on whether 
the OTC market required any modification or might be more adequately addressed 
through self-regulation, possibly in conjunction with some sort of government over-
sight.34 Born’s foray was met with swift opposition by Federal Reserve chairman Alan 
Greenspan, SEC chairman Arthur Levitt and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin. On 
the very same day, they jointly issued a statement in response to Born:
„On May 7, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (`CFTC´) issued 
a concept release on over-the-counter derivatives. We have grave concerns 
about this action and its possible consequences. The OTC derivatives market 
is a large and important global market. We seriously question the scope of the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction in this area […].“35
A few months later, in September 1998, Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) collapsed. The hedge fund had been run by two Nobel laureates, a for-
mer Federal Reserve official, and 25 PhDs. The LTCM incidence highlighted 
that losses resulting from OTC derivatives are not confined to unsophisti-
cated parties. LTCM had accumulated derivatives with a face value of $1.4tr, 
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one half of which were over-the-counter. Off-balance sheet and OTC deriv-
atives had allowed LTCM to build up excessive risk to the financial system. The 
firm had entered into more than 20,000 transactions with over 75 counterparties, 
making it „perhaps the world’s single most active user of interest rate swaps.“36 
On grounds of LTCM’s interconnectedness, leverage and complexity, the Federal 
Reserve orchestrated a bailout by banks, remarking that an „abrupt and disorderly 
close-out of Long-Term Capital’s positions would have posed unacceptable risks to 
the American economy.“37 Half a year later, the President’s Working Group on Finan-
cial Markets, including Greenspan, Levitt, Rubin and Born, presented an analysis of 
the LTCM fallout. It stressed the importance of better and more timely information 
on off-balance sheet liabilities and exposure and limiting excessive leverage. It noted 
that even banks „did not have a complete understanding of the risk profile […] 
because they seldom could get information incorporating transactions done with 
other dealers“. The report concluded that „regulators need expanded risk assess-
ment authority for the unregulated affiliates of broker-dealers and futures commis-
sion merchants.“38 In response to the LTCM crisis, swaps dealers had formed the 
Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group. In June 1999, this self-regulation 
and self-study organisation arrived at a similar conclusion as the President’s Work-
ing Group, voicing concerns over insufficient documentation of OTC derivatives.39 
Only half a year later, however, the President’s Working Group (now without Born, 
who had been forced to step down) came to a diametrically opposed conclusion. It 
now recommended that OTC derivatives be exempted from any regulatory over-
sight.40 The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 implemented the rec-
ommendations of the latter report and thereby laid the foundations for the subse-
quent boom of the OTC derivatives market, which grew from about $28tr at the 
time of the CFTC’s concept release to c. $600tr in 2007.41 
Two years after enacting the CFMA, the Enron bankruptcy in 2002 again high-
lighted the dangers of off-exchange derivatives, which had played a central role in 
the firm’s demise.42 In 2005, the swaps dealers’ self-regulatory organisation issued a 
report, warning of the industry’s „very limited experience with settling large num-
bers of transactions following a Credit Event“.43 As Greenberger (2009) notes: „This 
was certainly an internal industry acknowledgement that all was not well with the 
CDS market at that time.“44 In the same year, Timothy Geithner, then New York Fed 
President, requested banks to form a clearinghouse for OTC derivative contracts. 
Until 2008, this had not happened.45
Contrary to the Act’s title, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act did not 
modernise financial markets. On the contrary, it re-established pre-Great Depres-
sion opacity because it allowed certain derivatives activities to be privately negoti-
ated. This was the undoing of one of the most important accomplishments of post-
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Great Depression legislation. The loss of confidence during the 1920s and 1930s had 
triggered the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, which aimed at improving the availability of information. The Securi-
ties Act of 1933 required that all public offerings of securities be registered and all 
material information be fully disclosed so as to allow potential investors to judge 
the merit of the offering and make informed investment decisions.46 The Act was 
thus based on the modern notion „that investors are adequately protected if all 
aspects of the securities being marketed are fully and fairly disclosed“.47 The Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 expanded the scope from new securities offerings to virtu-
ally all listed securities. It stipulated periodic reporting and disclosure requirements 
(annual reports and quarterly earnings) for all corporations with listed securities.48 
By the end of the millennium, however, the provisions of the Securities Act and the 
Securities Exchange Act had been hollowed out as financial innovation had ena-
bled large, complex financial institutions to take risks unbeknownst to regulators 
and investors alike. Kane (1996) had already stressed that in order to control risk-
shifting of large institutions as a result of derivatives, a paradigm shift in accounting 
transparency was needed.49 By exempting OTC derivatives from regulatory over-
sight, policymakers, however, chose the opposite. The CFMA laid the foundation 
of a complex and intricate web of mutual exposure of large financial institutions, 
increasing systemic risk. The lack of information on these exposures helped make 
them too interconnected to fail, amounting to a subsidy for complexity. Indeed, the 
unprecedented degree of financial firms’ complexity and interconnectedness was 
to play an important role in the years 2007–2009. Probably most revealing in this 
regard is the near-failure of AIG due to credit default swaps (CDS). AIG had insured 
a plethora of counterparties against default of securities via credit default swaps of 
a notional amount of more than $500bn backed insufficiently by capital. As losses 
mounted, AIG’s failure was averted by an $180bn bailout on grounds of global banks’ 
and investment banks’ exposure to AIG. The firm’s survival was therefore considered 
to be of systemic importance.50 Indeed, considerations about systemic importance 
due to interconnectedness and complexity provided the main reasons for all bailouts 
during the Global Financial Crisis. Bair (2010), for example, attributes the different 
resolution method of the otherwise similar banks Washington Mutual, which was 
allowed to fail, and Wachovia, which was attempted to be bailed out, to their vary-
ing degree of complexity.51 Meanwhile, even former SEC chairman Levitt and Fed-
eral Reserve chairman Greenspan, both of whom had fervently supported the Com-
modity Futures Modernization Act, concede that the Act contributed to the finan-
cial crisis.52
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Self-Regulation
Concurrent with the legislations and interventions detailed above, regulators in the 
1990s increasingly began to rely on the financial sector’s assumed ability to regu-
late itself. However, as Greenspan conceded in 2008, „[t]hose of us who have looked 
to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders’ equity, myself 
included, are in a state of shocked disbelief.“53 In February 2009, Greenspan elabo-
rated on his ideological failure:
„All of the sophisticated mathematics and computer wizardry essentially 
rested on one central premise: that enlightened self interest of owners and 
managers of financial institutions would lead them to maintain a sufficient 
buffer against insolvency by actively monitoring and managing their firms’ 
capital and risk positions. When in the summer of 2007 that premise failed, I 
was deeply dismayed.“54
Why didn’t self-regulation in the financial sector work, while in other sectors it 
did and does? This question is of particular interest, since risk managers at finan-
cial firms were generally aware of the looming dangers well before 2007. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the excessive build-up of risk had been recognised by a large number 
of risk managers in the years prior to 2007. However, according to Sorkin (2010), 
objections expressed by risk managers at the very largest banks were systemati-
cally ignored. For example, Lehman Brothers’ Chief Risk Manager Madelyn Ant-
oncic was routinely asked to leave the room at executive committee meetings when 
the issue of risk came up. In 2007, Antoncic was removed from the committee alto-
gether.55 McLean & Nocura (2011) document how John Breit, one of the most tal-
Graph 1: Global OTC Derivatives Outstanding (Notional Amount, in $ Trillion) 
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ented risk managers at Merrill Lynch, was relegated to the back office and deprived 
of the required information to efficiently assess the firm’s risk. Following Breit’s ban-
ishment from the trading floor, Merrill Lynch increased its subprime portfolio of col-
lateralised debt obligations from $15 to $55bn unbeknownst to Breit.56 Similarly, in 
2004 Washington Mutual’s CRO Jim Vanasek had internally warned about an unsus-
tainable housing price bubble and loosening lending standards. Although WaMu’s 
CEO Kerry Killinger shared Vanasek’s concerns, he chose to increase the firm’s risk 
by implementing WaMu’s High Risk Lending Strategy shortly afterwards.57 As early 
as 2004, Freddie Mac’s Chief Risk Manager David Andrukonis had warned the firm’s 
CEO about the rising amount of increasingly risky loans which posed a threat to 
Freddie’s financial health. Alas, Andrukonis’ concerns were also ignored.58 At Fan-
nie Mae, Chief Risk Officer Enrico Dallavecchia expressed concerns over budgetary 
cuts in his division and the firm’s weak risk management infrastructure in general, 
earning him but the derisive nickname Dr. Doom and derogatory comments from 
Fannie Mae’s top management.59
The above stated examples illustrate that the crisis was not unanticipated. In fact, 
risk managers generally had done a good job in identifying risks, repeatedly caution-
ing against them. Their warnings, however, were mostly ignored. In this respect it is 
instructive to note that risk management functions are distinctively less respected 
than risk-taking functions. The subordinate role of chief risk officers to other top 
executives is reflected in the difference in compensation. For example, the Finan-
cial Crisis Inquiry Commission reports that Bear Stearn’s chief risk manager was 
paid less than one tenth of other top executives in 2006.60 Why did financial institu-
tions systematically act against the self-interest Greenspan so heavily relied upon? 
The answer to the question rests on the fact that self-regulation was not in the best 
interest of banks. Kaufman (1995) rightly observes that self-regulation, in general, is 
an important regulatory factor: „[M]ost industries in the United States are not reg-
ulated by the government. But their performance is regulated. It is regulated by the 
private marketplace.“61 Self-regulation in the financial sector, however, is fraught 
with problems. It is indicative and, as soon as the implications are considered, 
indeed startling, that in the non-financial sector, self-regulation is omnipresent. Yet, 
the term self-regulation is generally not associated with the non-financial sector. 
This is due to the fact that self-regulation is in the best interest of most firms. Hence 
regulators and the industry do not have to reiterate its viability in a mantra-like cho-
rus. For self-regulation to work, certain conditions need to be fulfilled. In the finan-
cial sector, however, there existed three important factors which prevented self-reg-
ulation from being a viable option:
First, policies in the years before 2007 greatly increased externalities. In other 
words, financial firms were allowed to profit from the upside while being shielded 
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from the downside. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Commodities Futures 
Modernization Act both contributed greatly to expanding the financial safety net 
for TBTF institutions. The government safety net for the financial sector had been 
large even before. Walter & Weinberg (2002) conservatively estimated that in 1999, 
45% of all liabilities of US financial institutions were either explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the government.62 After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the Commodi-
ties Futures Modernization Act had been passed in 1999 and 2000, respectively, the 
share of total liabilities guaranteed increased by 14 percentage points to 59% of total 
liabilities during the next decade.63 Of course, large financial institutions, owing to 
the TBTF doctrine, were equipped with a 100% guarantee. 
Second, consider a company that is financed by equity and debt. Certainly, both 
parties are in danger of losing their investment. However, equityholders are the 
residual claimants, and therefore debtholders only lose if all equity is wiped out. 
Hence, without information asymmetries, equityholders have an interest in con-
ducting business in a way that seeks opportunities (and hence takes risk) but only 
moderately so. In other words, the company will take a socially optimal amount 
of risk. However, given information asymmetries, i.e. if equityholders have more 
knowledge than creditors, then equityholders have an incentive to extract value at 
the expense of debtholders (moral hazard). Consequently, equityholders may take 
excessive risk at the cost of debtholders. Since debtholders are entitled only to a 
fixed repayment sum, any gain above the interest on debt will accrue to equityhold-
ers. However, losses that exceed equity capital will have to be borne by debthold-
ers. Summarising, it is well established that debt changes the incentives and subse-
quently the behaviour of residual claimholders (shareholders). Particularly highly 
leveraged firms, such as financial institutions, may be regarded as a call option64 by 
residual claimants.65 Consequently, holders of such levered equity claims have an 
incentive to increase risk and to take on even more debt at the expense of debthold-
ers in order to increase the value of their claim. It is therefore in the interest of debt-
holders to constrain both risk-taking as well as leverage in order to reduce the possi-
bility of insolvency. If a third party insures liabilities (as is the case with TBTF insti-
tutions), then the onus of disciplining owners to profit from the implicit call options 
falls on the guarantor of said liabilities. Hence the government and its regulatory 
agencies would have had good reasons to enforce strict oversight. Relying on self-
regulation was misguided and shifted potential losses from financial institutions to 
the government.
Third, related to the points above, the compensation structure in the financial 
sector significantly contributed to excessive risk-taking. As one of the first, a study 
by the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (2008) identified the compen-
sation system in the financial sector as among the top five primary driving forces 
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leading to the financial crisis. Hence, the organisation stressed the need for a better 
alignment of long-term interests and short-term incentives.66 Generally, executive 
compensation in the financial industry is comprised of a base salary plus bonus pay-
ments (common shares and options), the latter of which may be significantly higher 
than the former. For example, Dow Kim, former Merrill Lynch’s head of Global 
Markets and Investment Banking, received bonuses of $35m in 2006, which was 
one hundred times his base salary.67 Therefore, bank executives participate in any 
gains to shareholders, but at the same time are insulated from the consequences of 
extreme risk-taking resulting in losses for debtholders. Debtholders of TBTF insti-
tutions, however, had little incentive to closely monitor risk, since they possessed 
an implicit government guarantee. The asymmetric pay-off profile rendered exces-
sive risk-taking rational. As Bebchuck & Spamann (2010) point out, the prevailing 
reward system not only incentivised bank executives to take on excessive risk, but 
even made bets with negative expected value a privately optimal decision.68 Often, 
such strategies included taking on tail-risk, that is, strategies which yield a constant 
positive return with a small probability of extremely large losses.69 As long as losses 
do not materialise, the associated cash-flows may be confused with alpha (low risk 
but high returns) while, in fact, they only compensate for the underlying risk (or, in 
the case of negative expected value strategies, not even for the risk taken). If capi-
tal is insufficient to cover the losses when they materialise, these strategies promise 
a skewed payoff, i.e. profits in good times but limited losses in bad times. Tail-risk 
strategies are promising, as true alpha is often only identifiable in the long-run. In 
combination with the prevailing reward structure, such strategies promised large 
bonus payments as long as tail-risk did not materialise, but also implied losses that 
exceed capital, possibly by a large factor. The example of AIG is instructive in this 
context. In the lead-up to the crisis, AIG Financial Products became the most impor-
tant seller of credit default swaps, insuring counterparties against default of mort-
gage-backed securities, collateralised debt obligations and other credit risk with a 
notional value of more than $500bn. AIG profited heftily by collecting fees as long 
as the underlying instruments did not default. When they did, losses exceeded AIG 
capital by a multiple, requiring a government bailout of $180bn. From 2002 to 2007, 
AIG Financial Products CEO Joseph Cassano, however, earned a minimum of $38m 
annually.70 As Rajan (2008) puts it:
„True alpha can be measured only in the long run and with the benefit of 
hindsight – in the same way as the acumen of someone writing earthquake 
insurance can be measured only over a period long enough for earthqua-
kes to have occurred. Compensation structures that reward managers annu-
ally for profits, but do not claw these rewards back when losses materialise, 
encourage the creation of fake alpha. Significant portions of compensation 
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should be held in escrow to be paid only long after the activities that genera-
ted that compensation occur.“71
The Basel Accord
The failure of two globally active banks in 1974 – the US Franklin National Bank, 
which was bailed out, and Germany’s Bankhaus Herstatt  – revealed the need for 
international coordination of bank regulation. The international cooperation culmi-
nated in the Basel Accord in 1988, which set forth international best practice stand-
ards of bank regulation and aimed at reversing the international trend of decreas-
ing capital ratios as well as harmonising global bank regulation. Most importantly, 
Basel I introduced a minimum capital ratio of 8% of risk-weighted assets (RWA). 
Risk-weights were applied based on predefined asset buckets, the multiplication fac-
tor of which corresponded to their assumed risk. For example, cash and claims on 
OECD governments had a risk-weighting of 0%, mortgages had a risk-weighting of 
50% and private sector claims of 100%.72 However, the Basel Accord drew heavy crit-
icism, partly due to its crude measurement of risk. Particularly large banks argued 
for the use of internal models to calculate risk. The Basel Committee responded to 
the pressure with the 1996 amendment: it permitted banks to determine market risk 
using internal value-at-risk (VaR) models, a step that foreshadowed Basel II.73 The 
Basel II framework extended the use of the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach 
from market risk to credit risk. Banks were now allowed to fully rely on internal 
models when determining capital requirements. Underlying this method was not 
only the Basel Committee’s and regulators’ belief that banks knew better how to 
measure the risk of their banks but also, and perhaps more importantly, that they 
had an interest in doing so. At the same time, the Basel Committee was increasingly 
shaped by external factors in the development of Basel II. On the one hand, large 
financial institutions provided technical input as the Committee became aware that 
it had insufficient expertise, and on the other hand, the Basel II framework repeat-
edly made concessions to accommodate the demands of member countries which, 
in turn, were pressurised by domestic banks.74 As a corollary, it is not surprising that 
the Basel Committee was winning over large banks, which increasingly viewed Basel 
II as an opportunity for lower capital requirements.75 In 2003, Federal Reserve Vice 
Chairman Ferguson (2003) announced that the United States would take a bifur-
cated approach to the implementation of Basel II. Specifically, the US would adopt 
the Advanced Internal Ratings-Based (A-IRB) Approach76 for the ten largest banks 
with assets above $250bn or large foreign exposure. 77 Under heavy pressure from 
firms like Lehman Brothers, the SEC, too, adopted a Basel II IRB-like approach in its 
Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) programme for broker-dealers in 2004.78 The 
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alternative net capital rule changed the way net capital was calculated and expanded 
the definition of capital, „includ[ing] securities for which there is no ready market“,79 
the net effect of which was to increase broker-dealers’ leverage ratios. By the end of 
2008, none of the participating broker-dealers existed in their original form. Lehman 
Brothers had filed for bankruptcy, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch had to be merged 
with JPMorgan and Bank of America, respectively, while Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley had applied for bank holding status.
Ironically, while one of the goals of Basel II had been to solve the widening dis-
crepancy between capital and actual risk owing to off-balance sheet exposure and 
securitisation, it greatly increased the opportunity set of large banks to take on risk 
without a corresponding increase in capital. During the final stage of the bubble 
from 2004 to 2007, the assets of the ten largest financial institutions doubled, while 
risk-weighted assets increased only insignificantly.80 By 2007, the world’s 15 largest, 
most complex and interconnected banks were operating on an extremely thin capi-
tal cushion of 2.85%.81 Acharya (2012) shows that banks with a significant discrep-
ancy between risk-weighted assets and un-weighted assets suffered the worst mar-
ket capitalisation declines during the crisis, suggesting regulatory arbitrage.82 In this 
context, transferring mortgages off-balance sheet via securitisation often proved less 
costly than keeping loans on the balance sheet.83 Not surprisingly, a study by the 
Joint Forum (2011) identifies regulatory arbitrage as a major driver for securitisation 
until 2007.84 This observation is supported by the fact that issuers generally retained 
the credit risk associated with securitised assets,85 allowing them to generate fees 
from servicing off-balance sheet entities, and thereby refuting securitisation’s sup-
posed main purpose of risk transfer. As Barth, Caprio & Levine (2012) point out, 
one of the paradoxes of securitisation due to Basel was that banks were required to 
hold more capital for originating loans to borrowers they knew well and holding 
them in their portfolio until maturity. On the other hand, if they bought securitised 
loans from borrowers whose creditworthiness they did not know, they were required 
to hold only a fraction of capital.86
Credit Rating Agencies
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) constitute an important factor in the Global Finan-
cial Crisis due to their central role in the securitisation process – the epicentre of the 
financial crisis. In the years and decades before 2007, the rate of US homeownership 
had steadily increased as loan origination standards had been successively eroded. 
The availability of credit rested in no small part on the so-called process of „secu-
ritisation“ which in turn depended on favourable ratings by credit rating agencies.
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By securitisation, cash-flow generating assets, like mortgages, are pooled and 
subsequently transferred to a so-called special purpose vehicle and hence off the 
balance sheet. The special purpose vehicle then issues securities to financial mar-
kets, using the proceeds to pay for the assets received from the issuing bank. While 
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) entitle investors to a pro-rata share on cash-
flows from the mortgage pool, collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) are sliced into 
different tranches with varying seniority, compensating investors on a sequential 
basis. In other words, the most senior tranches receive the first cash-flows from the 
special purpose vehicle until their claim is fully satisfied. Subsequent cash-flows are 
then allocated to the next-senior tranche, the most junior one absorbing the first 
losses. In order to issue mortgage-backed securities and collateralised debt obliga-
tions, banks needed credit rating agencies to give favourable ratings, which, for a 
variety of reasons, they were happy to supply.
The main attraction of securitisation lay in the possibility of using diversifica-
tion effects to create securities that were rated better than the average of underly-
ing loans. Mortgages of low quality were pooled together and thus converted into 
triple A-rated mortgage-backed securities. This allowed for example pension funds, 
which had formerly been excluded from holding assets like mortgages, to expand 
their investment universe. Whereas banks had traditionally originated loans and 
held them to maturity, they now shifted to the originate-to-distribute model: loans 
were sold to investment banks, which securitised them to mortgage-backed securi-
ties and collateralised debt obligations. With this business strategy, loan originators 
had little incentive to screen mortgage borrowers, which contributed to decreas-
ing lending standards.87 As graph 2 reveals, the issuance of mortgage-backed secu-
rities dramatically increased in importance in the early 2000s, when loan quality 
decreased and loose lending standards made mortgages repayments increasingly 
unlikely. As collateralised debt obligations allow the creation of high-rated tranches 
out of qualitatively less good mortgage-backed securities, their increasing impor-
tance towards the end of the housing boom is particularly instructive (graph 3). 
Although credit rating agencies should have acted as a counterweight to decreasing 
lending standards before 2007, they wantonly neglected their pivotal role as gate-
keepers by fuelling the housing bubble with inflated ratings. This, too, is attributable 
to an ill-designed policy framework.
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) act as important gatekeepers to the capital mar-
kets by assessing companies’ creditworthiness and hence their ability to service 
debt and their probability of default. Historically, credit rating agencies had charged 
investors for their rating services. Beginning in the early 1970s, however, impor-
tant agencies switched their business model to charging issuers instead of inves-
tors.88 As issuers of securities have a vital interest in obtaining favourable rat-
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ings, and rating agencies seek to make profit by selling ratings, the new business 
model deeply undermined credit rating agencies’ objectivity. Moreover, credit rat-
ing agencies began offering consulting services to their customers. This kind of 
ancillary service introduced yet another conflict of interest, as credit rating agen-
cies which advise clients with regard to ratings may feel pressured to give more 
favourable ratings than they would otherwise do.89 Despite these conflicts of inter-
ests, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced the Nationally Recog-
nized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) designation in 1973 for the most 
important credit rating agencies.90 The elevation of their status gave the three firms 
a de facto oligopoly over credit ratings, which in itself is disturbing. The deci-
Graph 3: Global CDO Issuance, 2000–2012 (in $ Million)
Data: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
Graph 2: MBS Issuance in the US, 1981–2011 (in $ Million)
Data: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
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sion gets even more incomprehensible in the light of empirical evidence that even 
then, credit ratings seriously lacked informational value. Between 1950 and 1972, 
credit rating changes had merely reflected information already incorporated into 
bond prices and had lagged bond price changes by an average of 15 months.91 
Notwithstanding the severe short-comings of credit rating agencies, the NRSRO des-
ignation triggered a cascade of regulatory bodies making NRSRO ratings obligatory 
for securities dealings. Certain entities like pension funds were also mandated to use 
NRSRO ratings as a criterion for investable assets.92 Furthermore, the Basel Accord 
relied heavily on credit ratings for the purpose of determining capital requirements. 
Paradoxically, the increasing prosperity and influence of credit rating agencies went 
hand in hand with the declining informational value of credit ratings.93 The paradox 
ceases to be a paradox, however, as soon as the underlying economics of credit rat-
ing agencies are explored. The NRSRO designation gave a small number of credit 
rating agencies a governmental housekeeping seal of approval. This more than com-
pensated for these institutions’ inability to accurately assess risk. Mandated NRSRO 
ratings made demand for ratings inelastic to their quality because virtually any secu-
rity emission requires a rating by one of these firms. Even if the quality of ratings was 
perceived to be of no value, securities still had to be rated in order to comply with 
regulation. Thus, NRSROs became influential gatekeepers, not because of their good 
reputations or accurate credit ratings, but because regulations gave them the power 
to sell „regulatory licences, i.e., the right to be in compliance with regulation.“94 
Indeed, studies suggest that competition and market share considerations led to a 
„race to the bottom“.95 That NRSRO ratings did not accurately reflect the associated 
risk is confirmed by irrefutable empirical evidence. For example, by 2010, 93% and 
91% of all triple A-rated subprime loans issued in 2006 and 2007, respectively, had 
been downgraded to junk status.96 In 2005, collateralised debt obligations were ten 
times riskier than similar-rated corporate debt, despite the credit rating agencies’ 
claimed uniformity of rating scales.97 Moreover, congressional hearings and inter-
nal communication indicate that the agencies knew about the dangers of unrealis-
tic ratings of securities at least since 2003, but continued to issue inflated ratings.98 
That credit rating agencies are plagued by conflicts of interest had repeatedly 
been pointed out before 2007,99 yet regulators like Greenspan did not heed these 
warnings. Instead, they relied on rating agencies as a supposedly market-based sup-
plement to self-regulation. The government-sponsored cartel, however, rendered 
demand for NRSRO ratings non-responsive to ratings quality and therefore made 
prudential conduct of business costly. The three big rating agencies thus exploited 
their oligopoly powers by colluding with issuers and investors by providing overly 
optimistic ratings.100 
38 ÖZG 26 | 2015 | 1
In addition to fuelling the housing bubble by inflated ratings, credit rating agen-
cies further compounded the TBTF problem. According to Hau, Langfield & Mar-
qués-Ibañez (2012), NRSROs contributed significantly to the exponential growth of 
TBTF institutions. As too-big-to-fail institutions became „too-big-to-downgrade“, 
large financial institutions profited from rating favours, which provided them with 
ratings that were not justified by their fundamentals.101 The notion that large financial 
institutions were granted special treatment by credit rating agencies is substantiated 
by the findings of Efing & Hau (2013). They provide empirical evidence that between 
1999 and 2011, credit rating agencies granted substantial rating favours for struc-
tured products to their largest and most important clients. This practice suggests 
that considerations related to market share and follow-up business are likely motives 
for this preferential treatment.102 This suspicion is reinforced by Congressional 
investigations which demonstrated that investment banks actively (and successfully) 
exerted pressure on rating agencies to obtain undeservedly favourable ratings.103 
Despite the fact that large institutions knew that the ratings were overly optimis-
tic, TBTF institutions constituted the most active buyers of the most risky securi-
ties, again indicating regulatory arbitrage. Pinto (2010) points out that the institu-
tions’ size and their share of non-performing loans closely correlated. The largest 
four banks with assets above $1tr each had accumulated a disproportional share of 
risky mortgages, whose share of non-performing loans averaged 17.36%.104 
Conclusion
The empirical evidence supports the conclusion that a mix of ill-designed policies 
substantially contributed to the financial crisis of 2007–2009. During the decade 
preceding the crisis of 2007–2009, a large number of policies with huge societal costs 
had been enacted, legislated and maintained which were directly related to the cri-
sis. First, policies in the decade before 2007 compounded the TBTF problem. The 
TBTF problem, of course, was not new but rather a predictable consequence of gov-
ernment actions since the 1970s. Recurrent bailouts of large financial institutions 
had allowed banks and other financial firms to grow beyond what a market free of 
TBTF interventions would deem healthy and at the same time incentivised finan-
cial institutions to achieve TBTF size. However, both the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999 and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 compounded the 
TBTF problem by allowing banks and other financial institutions to grow in size 
and, perhaps more importantly, to grow in complexity. Hence, TBTF status for many 
of the large financial institutions had created huge externalities. In other words, fail-
ure of these firms would lead to large costs that would have to be borne by society 
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as opposed to the firms taking the risk. Second, and analogously to helping financial 
institutions achieve TBTF status, governments provided the very same with legisla-
tions which allowed them to exploit their status. In this context, regulators increas-
ingly relied on a supposed market approach to regulate the financial system, includ-
ing internal risk models and credit rating agencies. Regulators therefore bought into 
the premise that self-regulation was the best means of regulating the financial sector. 
Besides being influenced by financial firms’ lobbying efforts, Buiter (2008) argues 
that regulators fell victim to „cognitive regulatory capture“ by internalising „the 
objectives, interests and perception of reality of the vested interest they are meant to 
regulate and supervise in the public interest.“105 The observation that regulators’ per-
ception with regard to the financial sector was severely distorted is consistent with 
regulators‘ disparate approach to the financial sector vis-à-vis other industries. For 
example, when Chrysler was bailed out (for the first time, in 1979) by the govern-
ment, Greenspan remarked that he feared the bailout’s success more than its failure, 
as a successful bailout would smooth the way for even more government rescues.106 
Yet, Greenspan and other regulators ignored the perverse incentives recurrent bail-
outs in the financial sector had created. Given the existing externalities resulting 
from TBTF, self-regulation was determined to fail. With high leverage, the burden of 
disciplining risky behaviour shifts to debtholders. However, if financial institutions 
are too-big-to-fail, debtholders have little incentive to discipline inordinate risk-tak-
ing. If the government implicitly guarantees TBTF institutions’ liability side, then 
the government needs to reign in excessive risk-taking. Without the danger of fail-
ing, risk management and hence self-regulation whose very purpose is minimising 
the risk of failure is, of course, an extreme luxury and hence a wasteful and costly 
endeavour. Internal risk models enabled banks and other financial institutions to 
mathematically justify the shift to increasingly risky business models. Policymak-
ers therefore fell victim to irrational rationality, relying on the financial industry’s 
self-interest in regulating itself. This stance allowed financial institutions to increase 
risk, looting their firms in a predictable strategy of rational irrationality. In fact, it is 
difficult to envision firms not acting as they did given the existing externalities due 
to the financial safety net. Reliance on credit rating agencies suffered from similar 
problems. Given the oligopoly powers misguided policies had conferred on the larg-
est credit rating agencies, rating agencies were more concerned with gaining market 
share than accurately assessing the risk of financial instruments. NRSROs’ privileged 
status made colluding with issuers and investors by extending overly optimistic rat-
ings a privately optimal decision and therefore fuelled the housing bubble. 
By laying out the main policy failures in the decade preceding the Global Finan-
cial Crisis of 2007–2009, this article has attempted to raise awareness of the fac-
tors which influence policy-making and that neither deregulation nor regulation 
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necessarily advocate the public interest. In particular, both regulation and dereg-
ulation may have effects diametrically opposed to their intention in a pre-exist-
ing policy mix. In this context, „deregulation“ may amplify given policies rather 
than contribute to liberalised markets, and „regulation“ may accentuate problems 
rather than solve them. „Deregulation“ in the form of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act constituted a grave case of fraud-
ulent labelling and did not contribute to more liberalised markets. Instead, they 
expanded and extended the government’s safety net for large financial institutions. 
These legislations were enacted in response to demand and lobbying efforts by the 
financial sector and were not in the public interest. The shift towards self-regula-
tion, again deregulatory only on a superficial level, allowed financial institutions to 
game the system by exploiting their TBTF status. Regulation of credit rating agen-
cies also failed spectacularly, particularly as credit ratings were increasingly seen 
to be a market-based supplementary to self-regulation, ignoring the fact that oli-
gopoly powers had obliterated any market characteristics of credit rating agencies. 
To summarise, virtually all policies which affected the financial system in the dec-
ade leading to 2007 seem to have catered, consciously or unconsciously, to the finan-
cial sector and provided fertile grounds for government-subsidised risk-taking. Pol-
icymakers, lawmakers and regulators seem to have systematically  – and in many 
cases knowingly – chosen to pass and maintain legislation which was costly from 
a societal standpoint. By exempting large, complex financial institutions from the 
main pillar of capitalism – failure – enormous costs have been incurred on taxpay-
ers and the economy. While reforming the system may not be entirely easy, disman-
tling institutions that are both too large and too complex to exist may be a good 
point to start. 
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